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The uses and abuses of law in prerevolutionary Massachusetts is the subject of this scholarly, yet eminently readable book.
The manipulation of law and legal process by both the colonists
and the Crown was, of course, a response to political conditions.
A major strength of Professor Reid's analysis is the exposition of
how political policies can determine the parameters of peaceful
opposition. He accomplishes this by comparing the colonial experience in America with the success of British imperial law in
eighteenth-century Ireland. The book is far more than a contribution to comparative legal historiography however; it presents a
conception of law which transcends, and therefore challenges the
concept of law as simply that which is "set by political superiors
to political inferiors." '
Perhaps Reid's conception is best characterized by the title
he initially favored: "Lawless Law and Lawful Mobs." Like that
title, the analysis more often suggests by implication than argues
directly. That is appropriate, for the book is a historical rather
than a philosophical essay. The point is important, nonetheless,
because an author's assumptions about the nature of law inevitably color his or her analysis. In this regard it is both interesting
and instructive to compare Hiller Zobel's analysis of the Boston
2

Massacre.

Where Zobel, for example, regards the actions of the Boston
mobs as "obviously represent[ing] a retreat from the rule of
law,"'3 Reid considers them an expression of "whig law." Conceiving law to be a reflection of community values, he also sees whig
law manifested in the colonists' control of the civil and criminal
traverse juries and of the grand jury. For example, whig control
of the grand juries made it impossible for the British authorities
to obtain indictments against persons for political offenses. No
newspaper editor in prerevolutionary Massachusetts ever went to
jail, because although "[i]n term after term [Chief Justice
Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts] warned of the dangers of
seditious libel
1. J. AUSTIN,
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3. Id. at 47.
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no seditious libel to present." 4 Reid's explanation is simply that
"American whigs were incapable of recognizing anything offensive in a political statement or newspaper article supporting their
side of the controversy with the mother country. '",
Whig control of the civil traverse jury illustrates even more
dramatically the fundamental differences between whig and tory
legal theories. One colonial response to imperial revenue laws was
to bring civil actions against the customs official who enforced
them.' The case of Erving v. Cradock7 is typical. Cradock, in the
course of his official duties as customs collector had seized Erving's ship. In a British Admiralty court proceeding Erving agreed
to settle the matter by payment of 500 pounds sterling. He then
brought an action of trespass against Cradock in the common law
court and the whig jury held the latter liable for the damages
Erving suffered as a result of the seizure. To conclude that the
jury acted in disregard of the law in that case would be to ignore
whig legal theory, for "[tihe entire thrust of American discontent was based on constitutional theory. 'No representation, no
taxation,' was the whig slogan . . . . 'The Question,' General
Thomas Gage admitted in 1765 during the Stamp Act crisis, 'is
not the inexpediency of the Stamp Act, or of the inability of the
Colony to pay the Tax, but that it is unconstitutional, and contrary to their Rights, Supporting the Independency of the Provinces, and not Subject to the Legislative Power of Great Britain.' " Quite simply, Cradock's color of authority in seizing the
ship was disregarded by the jury because it derived from an imperial law that contravened the constitutional rights of the colonists.
It should be clear that Professor Reid's position is not predicated simply on his own conception of law; he perceives that the
colonists themselves shared that conception: "Regarding law as
a reflection of community consensus, expressed through the community's control of its own institutions, the whigs of Massachusetts Bay could not help but define 'law' differently than did
British lawyers and laymen . . . . " "Law from the imperial
perspective meant the command of parliament. For the American
whigs it still meant Lord Coke's custom and right reason."'' '
4. J. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE 46 (1977).
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6. See id. at 27-28.
7. See id. at 30-32.
8. Id. at 11.
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By incorporating the perspective of the people whose actions
are being explained, Professor Reid provides a meaningful dimension for historical analysis, and also shows great sensitivity to the
limitations of traditional social theory revealed in Roberto
Unger's recent critique." Reid's approach satisfies Unger's injunction that "subjective and objective meaning must somehow
both be taken into account,' 2 because he expressly incorporates
both the historical actors' and his own concept of law. That is a
strength, however, only of method. It is necessary to evaluate the
substance of the concept as well.
The fundamental assumption underlying Reid's concept of
law is revealed succinctly in the following passage: "The use of
whig law for political ends may not have always been legitimate
as sanctioned by legal precedent, but between competing legal
cultures it is acceptance that creates part of the legitimacy."'"
The idea of competing legal cultures within a single sovereignty
will seem strange to those who associate the very concept of law
with the apparatus and institutions of centralized government.
That identification is natural for lawyers, who experience the law
in the context of courts and legislatures. It has appealed to social
theorists 4 and legal philosophers as well.
H.L.A. Hart's approach to the question is interesting in that
he declines to define "law," and proposes instead to provide "an
improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal
system and a better understanding of the resemblances and differences between law, coercion, and morality, as types of social
phenomena.""6 Hart appears to use the term "municipal" in the
sense of "[rielating to a state or nation, particularly when considered as an entity independent of other states or nations."' In
thus emphasizing the structure of the legal system in state
societies, Hart does not expressly take a position as to whether
or not non-state societies can have law. Yet he subtly affirms the
traditional premise by characterizing primitive societies as regimes of primary rules of obligation only, 7 arguing that it is the
combination of primary rules with rules of recognition, change,
and adjudication which marks the "step from the pre-legal in to
11. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 8-37 (1976).
12. Id. at 15.
13. J. REID, supra note 4, at 69.
14. R. UNGER, supra note 11, at 49.
15. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 17 (1961).
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
17. H.L.A. HART, supra note 15, 89-96.
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the legal world.' 8 It seems, therefore, that in Hart's view the
American colonies could have law apart from the British only if
they constituted an independent state society.
The point is not simply one of correct word usage, but one of
meaning. To the whigs of Massachusetts Bay the issue was the
legitimacy of constituted power. Professor Reid's analysis shows
that the positivist concept of law as rules created in the context
of formal state government is too limited to capture the essence
of whig theory. There is a further point, however, which transcends that of our perception of the colonial experience. Our concept of law is crucially important because it affects our initial
perception of the sorts of human activities that are prima facie
considered to be within the legal realm. If we confine ourselves
to what is found in the context of a modern legal system, we
severely limit the objects of study and thus lose the opportunity
to expand our base of knowledge. Our initial purview, therefore,
ought to include any normative system which permits a social
"group to function by compelling its members to conform to common principles of behavior."' 9 John Reid's analysis of "whig law"
in prerevolutionary Massachusetts confirms the wisdom of such
an approach.
Maximilian J.B. Welker, Jr.*
18. Id. at 91. It is also significant that Hart entitles Chapter 15 of his book "Law as
the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules." (emphasis added).
19. Pospisil, The Ethnology of Law, 12 ADDISON-WESLEY MODULAR PUBLICATIONS 26
(1972). See Pospisil's discussion of the "Multiplicity of Legal Systems," id. 26-29. See also
E. LEACH, CUSTOM, LAW, AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE (1977), for an example of how a functional approach can contribute to our understanding of an important contemporary problem.
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